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Introduction 
Roughly 80 percent of low-wage workers in the U.S. do not have access to paid sick leave. 
Commentators have noted that the U.S. lags behind other countries by failing to mandate employers 
offer paid sick leave (Heymann et al. 2007). This proposition has been gaining popular and legislative 
support across many U.S. cities and states. President Obama has called for a federal law to guarantee 
workers paid sick leave to recover from illness or care for sick family members (Obama 2014). 
At the same time, there are fears that mandating paid sick leave will lead to negative labor market 
consequences. The arguments are similar to those advanced against minimum wage increases or 
mandated employer-provided health insurance: more workers will enter the low-wage labor market and 
businesses will reduce hiring, which will hurt workers who most desperately need jobs (Summers 1989; 
Kolstad & Kowalski 2014). On the other hand, it is possible that this policy will not have much impact. 
Most paid sick leave laws equate to very slight pay increases. Compared to other reforms, the benefits 
to workers and costs to businesses are minor. Whether there is an observable impact is an empirical 
question, where greater care must be taken to ensure that the empirical framework does not suffer 
from bias as any impact generated is expected to be small. 
We use the American Community Survey (ACS), a difference-in-differences approach, and the paid sick 
leave law enacted in Connecticut in 2012 to estimate the initial impacts of the mandate. This approach is 
attractive for three reasons. First, statewide implementation avoids concerns about overlapping labor 
markets, an issue present with citywide implementation (Ahn 2011). Second, Connecticut is surrounded 
by similar states that serve as a control. Third, several nearby states will soon introduce paid sick leave, 
which dampens mobility responses across state borders. 
Data 
We use one-year samples of the 2009-2012 ACS Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS). The number of 
records contained in a one-year PUMS file is about one percent of the total in the nation.1 Unlike most 
surveys, respondents are required to participate in the ACS.2 To create the sample, we examine 
Connecticut and the five other states that comprise the New England region (Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, Vermont, Rhode Island, and Maine). 
 
                                                          
1 http://www.census.gov/acs/www/data_documentation/public_use_microdata_sample/  
2 http://www.census.gov/acs/www/Downloads/language_brochures/ACSQandA_ENG10.pdf. 
The ACS asks labor force information on individuals aged 16 and older; we focus on individuals aged 16 
to 64, excluding individuals who have imputed values on key demographic variables. We also exclude an 
individual from a particular regression if the pertinent response was imputed.3 We focus on three 
contemporaneous measures of work activity: work in the previous week, unemployment and labor force 
participation.4 
 
Table 1 presents summary statistics. In the full sample, there are more than 347,000 individuals. The 
typical respondent worked more than 1,400 hours per year. More than three-quarters of the sample 
was in the labor force, and of those, 9 percent was unemployed. Approximately 37 percent of the 
sample has a high school diploma or less, more than 80 percent is white, and 7 percent is legal non-
citizens. Labor market outcomes gradually improved over this period, as the economy was emerging 
from the Great Recession. The final two columns compare Connecticut to other New England states. 
Although many labor market variables are similar, annual wage income is higher in Connecticut. It also 
has a larger fraction minority and non-citizens. Among those who are working (or had worked in the 
past 5 years), nearly 30 percent are classified as service workers, the occupation targeted by the law. 
 
Description of the Connecticut Paid Sick Leave Law 
Connecticut General Statute 31-57r mandates that large firms (50 or more employees) must offer paid 
sick leave to service workers beginning January 1, 2012. A worker accrues one hour of sick leave for 
every 40 hours worked, which equates to a 2.5 percent pay increase at most (if all sick leave hours are 
used). Workers cannot earn (or use) more than 40 hours of sick leave and are allowed to carry over a 
maximum of 40 hours from year to year. In 2012, no other New England state had a similar law in place. 
Table 2 shows – using County Business Patterns data for Connecticut in 2012 – the fraction of workers in 
each industry employed at large firms. The mandate would be expected to have large impacts on the 
“Educational Services,” “Management of Companies and Enterprises,” “Health Care and Social 
Assistance,” “Administrative and Support,” “Transportation and Warehousing,” and “Information” 
sectors. Although “Manufacturing” should have many affected workers, this industry was exempt from 
the mandate. 
 
                                                          
3 This follows recommendations of Bollinger and Hirsch (2006). 
4 The ACS contains annual measures of work, but we cannot use them in the analysis because the answers mostly 
pertain to the period before the sick leave law. 
Theory Model  
 
Below is a simple theory model that sketches out some predictions to test for in the empirical section: 
Assume there are two types of workers: young (y) and old (o). Both have a uniform distribution of ability 
𝛿 ∈ [0,1]. There are 𝑁�𝑦  and  𝑁�𝑜 potential young and old workers, respectively. There is one type of firm 
in the economy that can choose to search for either young or old workers. The firms create vacancies 
until the expected zero profit condition binds. 
Assume that old workers must be out of work sick that is equivalent to productivity 𝑠𝑜 . Equivalently, 
young workers must be out of work sick that is equivalent to productivity 𝑠𝑦 . Assume for simplicity that 
𝑠𝑦 = 0. 
Utility of old and young workers are defined thusly: 
𝑈𝑜 = 𝑃𝑜(𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑜 + 𝛼𝑠𝑜) − 𝐾 
𝑈𝑦 = 𝑃𝑦�𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑦� − 𝐾 
Where 𝛼 is a measure of utility gained from being home to nurse a potential illness (compared to having 
to come to work), and 𝐾 is a search cost that must be paid to seek to match with a vacancy. Assume 
again, for simplicity, that 𝐾 = 1. The probability of finding a vacancy for old and young workers is 
defined by:  
𝑃𝑜 =  𝑥𝑜𝑁𝑜 
𝑃𝑦 = 𝑥𝑦𝑁𝑦 
The number of matches 𝑥𝑘  where k=y or o, is a Cobb-Douglas on the interior: 
𝑥𝑘 =  𝑚𝑖𝑛 {𝛾𝐽𝑘𝜃𝑁𝑘𝜃, 𝐽𝑘 ,𝑁𝑘}  
The 𝛾 is a normalizing constant, and 𝜃 ∈ (0,1). For simplicity, we assume 𝜃 = 1
2
, which is consistent with 
a CRS matching function where the number of vacancies (𝐽𝑘)and number of searchers(𝑁𝑘) equally 
contribute to the probability of matching with each other. 
Wage is defined by a Rubenstein bargaining game with firms, such that for the worker takes the share of 
the productivity generated. The bargaining power of the worker is 𝛽,𝛽 ∈ (0,1). Therefore, the wage for 
old and young workers, respectively, is: 
𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑜 = 𝛽(𝛿𝑖 − 𝑠𝑜) 
𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑦 =  𝛽(𝛿𝑖) 
Clearly, for two workers with identical abilities, under the model with no mandated paid-sick-leave, 
younger workers are paid a higher wage than older workers, since they are more productive, due to less 
days out sick. 
Then it is trivial to show that the marginal old (young) worker to search is: 
𝛿𝑜
∗ = � 1
𝑃𝑜
+ (𝛽 − 𝛼)𝑠𝑜� 1𝛽 
𝛿𝑦
∗ = � 1
𝑃𝑦
�
1
𝛽
 
That is, old and young workers find it worthwhile to search for a job as long as their ability is above the 
cut off ability value defined above. Note that for similar values of probability of matching from the 
worker side,  𝛿𝑜∗ < 𝛿𝑦∗  , since we expect (𝛽 − 𝛼) > 0  (as is the nature of involuntary sick days) .Since 
ability is distributed uniform, the number of old and young searchers is defined by: (1 − 𝛿𝑜∗) ⋅ 𝑁�𝑜 = 𝑁𝑜 
�1 − 𝛿𝑦∗� ⋅ 𝑁�𝑦 = 𝑁𝑦  
Firms search for old and young workers according to the following expected zero-profit condition: 
𝑞𝑜(1 − 𝛽)(𝐸(𝛿|𝑜) − 𝑠𝑜) − 𝐶 = 0 
𝑞𝑦(1 − 𝛽)𝐸(𝛿|𝑦) − 𝐶 = 0 
Where 𝑞𝑘is the probability of the firm successfully matching with a worker in 𝑘 = 𝑦 𝑜𝑟 𝑜. Note that 
because of the uniform distribution assumption, we can plug in for 𝐸(𝛿|𝑜)= 1−𝛿𝑜∗
2
 and 𝐸(𝛿|𝑦)= 1−𝛿𝑦∗
2
. 
Solving for the fraction of searching workers over the number of vacancies: 𝑁𝑘
𝐽𝑘
 and simplifying, we find 
that: 
𝑁𝑘
𝐽𝑘
=  𝜎2 ± (𝜎4 − 4𝜎2𝜔 − 2𝜔)1/22  
Where 𝜎 = (𝛽 − (3𝛽 −  𝛼)𝑠𝑘)𝛾 and 𝜔 =  2𝛽𝐶(1−𝛽).  There are two potential solutions, where the ratio in 
question can increase or decrease depending on whether we use  
𝑁𝑘
𝐽𝑘
=  𝜎2 − (𝜎4 − 4𝜎2𝜔 − 2𝜔)1/22  
 
Or  
𝑁𝑘
𝐽𝑘
=  𝜎2 + (𝜎4 − 4𝜎2𝜔 − 2𝜔)1/22  
The easiest way to see this is to note that as you increase the number of sick leaves you must take, your 
ability draw must also increase to make it worth your while to search for a position. Therefore, while the 
firm loses productivity from a sicker worker because he/she is absent more often, he/she is also more 
productive from the start (or in expectation, any worker will be more productive).  
Therefore, paradoxically, the sicker worker in expectation will be more productive, and in some cases, 
will face higher or lower probability of unemployment, depending on the equilibrium, which is 
determined initially by the ratio of searching workers to vacancies. 
Now, if a paid-sick-leave mandate is introduced, the worker and firm decisions change in the following 
manner: 
𝑈𝑜 = 𝑃𝑜(𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑜 + 𝛼𝑠𝑜) − 𝐾 
𝑈𝑦 = 𝑃𝑦�𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑦 + 𝛼𝑚𝑠𝑚� − 𝐾 
 
Here, 𝑠𝑚 is the mandated amount of paid-sick-leave. For young workers, 𝛼𝑚 represents the value of 
“forced” sick days. They do not need to stay home desperately to nurse an illness, but they probably do 
get some amount of enjoyment out of it. Importantly, we assume that 𝛼𝑚 is quite small, certainly 
smaller than 𝛽: the point being that if they would trade in the paid-sick-leave for extra pay if they could. 
We assume that 𝑠𝑚 < 𝑠𝑜. Note that the older worker utility function is identical. However, younger 
worker utility changes, since the worker may as well take the “free” vacation days offered. 
The wages change in the following manner: 
𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑜 = 𝛽(𝛿𝑖 − 𝑠𝑜) + 𝛽𝑠𝑚 
𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑦 =  𝛽(𝛿𝑖 − 𝑠𝑚) + 𝛽𝑠𝑚 = 𝛽𝛿𝑖  
 
Note that the last term is the paid-sick-leave that is “returned” to the worker. Because our model is 
short-run, we assume sticky prices (wages), and firms cannot adjust the productivity measure to account 
for the paid-sick-leave. 
Then, proceeding as before, we find: 
𝛿𝑜
∗ = � 1
𝑃𝑜
+ (𝛽 − 𝛼)𝑠𝑜� 1𝛽 − 𝑠𝑚 
𝛿𝑦
∗ = � 1
𝑃𝑦
− 𝛼𝑚𝑠𝑚�
1
𝛽
 
And the firm problem changes to: 
𝑞𝑜[(1 − 𝛽)(𝐸(𝛿|𝑜) − 𝑠𝑜) − 𝛽 𝑠𝑚] − 𝐶 = 0 
𝑞𝑦[(1 − 𝛽)(𝐸(𝛿|𝑦) − 𝑠𝑚) − 𝛽𝑠𝑚] − 𝐶 = 0 
We do not solve for the complete model here, but two points demonstrate the insight from our 
empirical section. First, unsurprisingly, because of the −𝑠𝑚 term, 𝛿𝑜∗ must decline, compared to the no 
mandate regime. This means that more older workers are now searching (we are hand-waving a bit, 
since 𝑃𝑜 must also adjust). Younger workers increase search in the market as well, but the amount of 
change depends critically on 𝛼𝑚. If this is very small, as we assume above, the change in the number of 
young workers is most likely very small, compared to the regime with no mandate.  
From the firm side, we see that recruitment for both young and old workers is dampened due to the 
extra burden of the paid-sick-leave: −𝛽𝑠𝑚. However, older workers are hit particularly hard here, 
because the 𝐸(𝛿|𝑜) term is expected to decline precipitously. This is because a greater number of older 
workers who are less productive enter the market, driving down the expected random productivity draw 
from older workers. Then, to make up for this, 𝑞𝑜 must increase substantially. The only way this can be 
accomplished is for firms to severely pull back on the number of vacancies for older workers: 𝐽𝑜. 
We predict that the labor force participation increase for young workers will be zero to a very small 
positive number. Employment change for young workers is also predicted to be a small negative number. 
Firms face higher cost, but increased LFPR of young workers will result in a higher probability of match 
from the firm side. 
A paid-sick-leave mandate is expected to result in more older workers searching and higher 
unemployment for older workers. Note here that we do not allow firms to selectively choose higher 
ability older workers. If this type of selection is allowed, the impact for poor older workers would be 
even more severe.  
 
Empirical Analysis 
We rely on a “difference-in-differences” estimator: 
(1) 𝑂𝑈𝑇𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 ∙ 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑠 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑠 + 𝛽4𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡 
 
where 𝑂𝑈𝑇𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑠𝑡  is one of the contemporaneous labor market outcomes for individual i in state s in 
year t, 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 ∙ 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑠 is the interaction term that proxies for Connecticut’s paid sick leave mandate, 
and 𝑋𝑖  is a set of characteristics that vary at the individual level. In various specifications we include 
dummy variables for 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 (or a set of year dummies), 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑠 (or a set of state dummies), and state-
year trends. All specifications are estimated as linear models with weights, and standard errors are 
corrected for with non-nested two-way clustering at the state and year levels (Cameron, Gelbach, & 
Miller, 2011). 
 
The results in Table 3 show that the sick leave law had modest, but negative economic consequences. 
While this is unsurprising given the actual magnitude of the policy, our prior was that there would be no 
observable impact. However, the negative employment effect is clear across multiple specifications.5 
The effect on labor force participation (LFPR) is small; LFPR increases by 0.3 percent. It is imprecisely 
estimated and, at most, suggestive of marginal workers being induced to enter the labor force. As a 
result of increased competition and decreased labor demand, the fraction of unemployed workers 
increases by 0.9 percentage points. Because firms respond by reducing the number of vacancies, 
deadweight loss is positive. The likelihood of working decreases by a similar amount. 
At the bottom of Table 3, we separate the results by age, for several reasons. First, education may be 
incomplete for young workers. Second, sick leave is more valuable to those in poor health or those who 
have sick children, and older age proxies for this. Results suggest that older workers have a higher 
valuation of sick leave, and firms perceive older workers as more costly. 
 
Conclusion 
We analyzed the short-run impacts of Connecticut’s sick leave law and found a small decrease in 
employment concentrated on older workers. Although there are real labor market impacts, the 
magnitudes seem rather small to justify the level of political and popular interest in the policy. 
While our estimates capture the short-run impact of the law, they do not offer insight into long-run 
consequences. For instance, firms near state borders may relocate or adjust employee numbers/work 
hours. Firms in affected industries may also shift costs back to workers (Summers 1989; Gruber 1994). 
Our future work will examine these outcomes when data becomes available. The key market failure 
motivating paid sick leave laws is mitigating the spread of infectious disease. Given the modest labor 
market cost, future studies should also examine whether such benefits have appeared. 
  
                                                          
5 If we include state and year fixed effects, state-year trends, individual demographic characteristics, and the state 
minimum wage, results become statistically insignificant. See appendix Table 1. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
All 2009 2010 2011 2012 CT 
Other 
states 
In labor force 0.789 0.794 0.787 0.786 0.787 0.794 0.787 
Worked 0.710 0.718 0.704 0.708 0.713 0.712 0.710 
Unemployed 0.090 0.087 0.097 0.090 0.086 0.098 0.087 
Hours in last 12 
months 
1,422 
(1,020) 
1,453 
(1,007) 
1,403 
(1,019) 
1,412 
(1,028) 
1,421 
(1,026) 
1,427 
(1,027) 
1421 
(1,018) 
Worked in last 
12 months 0.803 0.820 0.799 0.796 0.799 0.800 0.804 
Wages in last 12 
months 
37,029 
(57,690) 
38,753 
(60,335) 
36,806 
(57,217) 
35,778 
(54,689) 
36,740 
(58,276) 
41,482 
(70,938) 
35,609 
(52,694) 
State minimum 
wage 
8.17 
(0.39) 
8.37 
(0.34) 
8.32 
(0.35) 
8.07 
(0.34) 
7.92 
(0.35) 
8.48 
(0.16) 
8.07 
(0.39) 
Paid sick leave 
mandate? 0.060 0 0 0 0.241 0.247 0 
Service worker 0.291 0.278 0.297 0.294 0.296 0.29 0.292 
Age 
40.3 
(14.0) 
40.1 
(13.8) 
40.3 
(14.0) 
40.5 
(14.1) 
40.4 
(14.1) 
40.5 
(13.9) 
40.3 
(14.0) 
Male 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 
White 0.81 0.83 0.81 0.81 0.80 0.73 0.84 
Black 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.10 0.05 
Hispanic 0.082 0.075 0.082 0.084 0.086 0.123 0.068 
Non-citizen 0.073 0.072 0.074 0.072 0.073 0.085 0.069 
Married 0.494 0.501 0.492 0.497 0.485 0.5 0.492 
Military service 0.065 0.069 0.066 0.065 0.058 0.059 0.067 
Child aged 0-5 0.04 0.04 0.041 0.04 0.039 0.041 0.04 
Child aged 6-17 0.099 0.1 0.099 0.099 0.097 0.106 0.096 
Children aged  
0-5 and 6-17 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.032 0.028 
Difficulty with 
English 0.07 0.069 0.071 0.072 0.069 0.084 0.066 
No diploma 0.117 0.12 0.119 0.118 0.111 0.123 0.115 
HS grad/GED 0.253 0.255 0.255 0.248 0.256 0.252 0.254 
Some college 0.289 0.29 0.286 0.291 0.288 0.283 0.291 
College graduate 0.341 0.335 0.34 0.343 0.346 0.342 0.341 
Observations 347,169 85,343 85,864 88,683 87,279 83,934 263,235 
Notes: All values weighted. All dollar amounts in constant 2012 dollars. Standard deviations in 
parentheses. 
 
  
Table 2: Employment in Large Firms 
NAICS 
Code Industry 
2012 
Employment 
Fraction 
In large 
firm 
Fraction 
Employment 
Not 
Suppressed 
 
Full state 1,463,732 0.59 1.00 
11 Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting 338 0.00 0.84 
21 Mining, Quarrying, and Oil and Gas Extraction 1,111 0.00 0.37 
23 Construction 49,438 0.25 0.96 
31 Manufacturing 153,757 0.69 0.79 
42 Wholesale Trade 72,424 0.56 1.00 
44 Retail Trade 183,809 0.49 1.00 
48 Transportation and Warehousing 39,996 0.68 1.00 
51 Information 36,542 0.65 0.94 
52 Finance and Insurance 115,456 0.55 0.72 
53 Real Estate and Rental and Leasing 18,753 0.18 0.84 
54 Professional, Scientific and Technical Services 102,622 0.53 0.96 
55 Management of Companies and Enterprises 36,011 0.86 0.99 
56 
Administrative and Support and Waste 
Management and Remediation Services 90,045 0.67 0.93 
61 Educational Services 66,005 0.86 1.00 
62 Health Care and Social Assistance 268,876 0.68 1.00 
71 Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation 25,460 0.50 0.97 
72 Accommodation and Food Services 134,280 0.29 0.88 
81 Other Services, except Public Administration 59,762 0.12 0.97 
99 Unclassified 55 0.00 0.84 
Notes: Data from County Business Patterns data for Connecticut for 2012. Employment in several 
industries suppressed; thus industry totals do not add up to state totals. 
 
  
Table 3: Estimates of Connecticut’s Sick Leave Law 
 In labor force Unemployed 
 
Worked 
 
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡
∙ 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑠  
0.0022 
(0.0020) 
0.0022 
(0.0026) 
-0.0061 
(0.0116) 
0.0088 
(0.0010) 
0.0089 
(0.0023) 
0.0023 
(0.0025) 
-0.0092 
(0.0016) 
-0.0092 
(0.0016) 
-0.0124 
(0.0017) 
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡  -0.0053 
(0.0023) 
--- --- -0.0063 
(0.0022) 
--- --- 0.0027 
(0.0033) 
--- --- 
𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑠  0.0068 
(0.0034) 
--- --- 0.0028 
(0.0033) 
--- --- 0.0075 
(0.0038) 
--- --- 
Obs. 342,278 266,824 340,077 
 
Under 30 Sub-sample 
 In labor force Unemployed 
 
Worked 
 
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡
∙ 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑠  
-0.0014 
(0.0066) 
-0.0015 
(0.0062) 
-0.0055 
(0.0103) 
0.0046 
(0.0028) 
0.0047 
(0.0033) 
0.0017 
(0.0041) 
-0.0089 
(0.0083) 
-0.0090 
(0.0080) 
-0.0110 
(0.0129) 
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 -0.0070 
(0.0057) 
--- --- -0.0087 
(0.0027) 
--- --- 0.0035 
(0.0081) 
--- --- 
𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑠  0.0062 
(0.0077) 
--- --- 0.0030 
(0.0043) 
--- --- 0.0097 
(0.0091) 
--- --- 
Obs. 86,713 59,236 85,974 
30 and Over Sub-sample 
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡
∙ 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑠  
0.0021 
(0.0022) 
0.0021 
(0.0030) 
-0.0033 
(0.0053) 
0.0102 
(0.0012) 
0.0103 
(0.0025) 
0.0027 
(0.0028) 
-0.0106 
(0.0021) 
-0.0107 
(0.0031) 
-0.0099 
(0.0036) 
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 -0.0030 
(0.0021) 
--- --- -0.0057 
(0.0023) 
--- --- 0.0040 
(0.0030) 
--- --- 
𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑠  0.0108 
(0.0041) 
--- --- 0.0023 
(0.0035) 
--- --- 0.0107 
(0.0034) 
--- --- 
Obs. 255,565 207,588 254,103 
State 
dummies? 
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Year 
dummies? 
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
State-year 
trends? 
No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Notes: All specifications weighted and corrected for non-nested two-way clustering. Sample drawn from 2009-
2012 ACS using New England states. All specifications include controls for age, gender, education, race/ethnicity, 
citizenship, marital status, military service, children, difficulty with English and a constant term. 
 
 
Appendix 
Appendix Table 1: Estimates of Connecticut’s Sick Leave Law 
 In labor force Unemployed 
 
Worked 
 
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡
∙ 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑠  
0.0022 
(0.0022) 
0.0013 
(0.0015) 
-0.0014 
(0.0034) 
0.0085 
(0.0009) 
0.0085 
(0.0023) 
-0.0011 
(0.0052) 
-0.0090 
(0.0014) 
-0.0098 
(0.0013) 
-0.0041 
(0.0048) 
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡  -0.0051 
(0.0032) 
--- --- -0.0028 
(0.0024) 
--- --- 0.0008 
(0.0036) 
--- --- 
𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑠  0.0066 
(0.0029) 
--- --- -0.0011 
(0.0032) 
--- --- 0.0097 
(0.0040) 
--- --- 
𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑊𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑠𝑡  0.0005 
(0.0076) 
0.0254 
(0.0070) 
0.0276 
(0.0188) 
0.0101 
(0.0059) 
0.0097 
(0.0137) 
-0.0201 
(0.0169) 
-0.0055 
(0.0090) 
0.0159 
(0.0071) 
0.0481 
(0.0205) 
State 
dummies? 
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Year 
dummies? 
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
State-year 
trends? 
No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Sample size 342,278 266,824 340,077 
Notes: All specifications are weighted, and correct for non-nested two-way clustering via method in Cameron, 
Gelbach and Miller (JBES, 2011). Sample drawn from 2009-2012 ACS using 6 New England States. All specifications 
include controls for age, gender, education, race/ethnicity, citizenship, marital status, military service, children, 
difficulty with English and a constant term. 
 
Once we include all individual level demographic variables, state and year dummies, state, year trends, 
AND state-level minimum wage, many of our results become statistically insignificant. This is most likely 
due to the high degree of collinearity among the state minimum wage levels and the combination of 
state and year dummies and the state-year trend. 
New England states minimum wages between 2009 and 2012 were as follows:  
Federal: $6.55 in 2009, $7.25 thereafter 
CT: $8.00 in 2009, $8.25 thereafter 
MA: $8.00 
NH: $7.25 
RI: $7.40 
VT: $8.06 in 2009-10, $8.15 in 2011, $8.46 in 2012 
ME: $7.25 in 2009, $7.50 thereafter 
 
(Source: http://www.dol.gov/whd/state/stateMinWageHis.htm and http://www.dol.gov/whd/minwage/america.htm)  
 
For MA, NH, and RI, the state dummies would have tracked minimum wage perfectly (with a slight 
correction for inflation, which was also stable year to year). For VT, a state, year trend with parameter 
value around 1.02 would have predicted the minimum wage trajectory very closely. For CT and ME, 
beyond 2009, state dummies would have tracked minimum wage perfectly.  
Overall, then, it is no surprise the inclusion of state minimum wage creates problems for the regression. 
